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Ladies and Gendemen, I am neither a legal scholar nor an academic. In fact, my only real academic credential stems from the fact that I once was 
privileged to preside over the world's finest War College - the institution in 
which we meet today. What I am is a retired naval officer, an aviator by military 
profession, and a fonner Batde Force Commander. Through a period of3S years 
of active duty service I became familiar with the responsibility that goes along 
with the application of military force in pursuit of national interests. My purpose 
here is to present my view - the view of the naval warrior - of the realities 
of naval warfare in the modem world. To do this I must first describe what I 
think might happen during a future conflict. 
I. The Future Conflict 
We'll start with some assumptions concerning the nature of future conflict. 
First, I assume that in the current international political climate, the likelihood 
of a large, conventional and declared war is relatively low, while the likelihood 
of a limited conflict is high. Second, I assume that any conflict today, particularly 
one that might be prolonged, will involve economic targeting. Third, I assume 
that modem warfare, even that of a limited nature, will be fought, in part at least, 
with technologically advanced weapons. Fourth, and here, perhaps, is my 
shakiest assumption, I assume that the recent events in the Persian Gulf are a 
prototype of contemporary international anned conflict which may occur in the 
maritime environment. Each of these requires some further explication. 
A. Limited Conflict 
My first assumption, that conflict will be of a limited nature, requires some 
definition. I fully recognize that "limited" is a tenn that may mean many things 
to many people. Certainly it is no comfort to the person being shot at that the 
conflict he is engaged in may be perceived by outsiders as limited. It is rather 
like an observation made by Admiral Jim Watkins when he was the Chief of 
Naval Operations. In referring to the state of world order, he remarked that this 
may indeed be a time of peace, but it is a very violent one. For my purposes, I 
view limited conflict as one that involves few belligerents and is conventional 
(i.e., non-nuclear) in its nature. 
In my opinion, we have reached a stage in world history when the interests 
of peace :u:e truly global in nature. I think it beyond question that it is in the 
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best interests of both the Soviet Union and the United States to preserve the 
peace - however tense that peace might be from time to time. To a greater 
extent than ever before, the world today is largely comprised of status quo 
powers. More than this, virtually all nations of the world have an interest in 
containing the effects of armed conflict. 
Most nations prefer to see the international polity continue largely as it exists; 
yet an anomaly persists. In some parts of the world, war still retains the natural 
and legitimate connotations it had in the Western world prior to World War 1. 
My view of the world yields a "good news/bad news" cliche. The bad news is, 
international conflict will continue to exist into the foreseeable future, even in 
the presence of a relatively universal desire for peace. The good news is that such 
conflict probably will be limited in scope, if not in nature. No rational belligerent 
nation will want to risk resort to expansive warfighting means that may invite 
other nations to become belligerents in opposition to them, and no ostensibly 
neutral nation will want to commit itself to a struggle for its very survival solely 
in another nation's interest.1 
In addition, since modem technology produces weapons that give a significant 
advantage to the nation that strikes first, it is unreasonable to expect that highly 
publicized declarations of war will precede contemporary hostilities. The last 
declaration of war was the Arab-Israeli War of1948; since that time, no nation 
has, in that manner, signaled its intent to engage in hostilities.2 Given the 
technological and legal sophistication of nations today, I will assume that future 
conflicts also will commence without formalities. 
B. Targeting Economic Assets 
My second assumption, that future wars will involve targeting of economic 
assets, is based on two premises. First, I believe the days of territorial conquest are 
now a part of history. This is not to say that wars may not continue to erupt over 
disputed claims of sovereign territory, but I consider it highly unlikely that future 
wars will be fought for literal national survival- in part because the international 
polity cannot accept the possibility that a nation may pass out of existence at the 
pleasure of another nation. Witness, for ex .• mple, the concerns of many smaller 
nations over the relatively benign 1983 invasion of Grenada by U.S. forces. 
Second, since territorial conquest is an unlikely result of future wars, an 
alternative means of bringing armed conflict to a favorable conclusion will be 
employed. I believe the mechanism of choice will be an attempt to diminish the 
enemy's economic capability to continue the war effort.3 Of course, throughout 
history economics frequendy has played a role in war-fighting tactics and 
strategy. The difference today is that now it could be a predominant factor. 
If my first assumption is a correct one, that wars will be fought by limited 
numbers of nations, then in a very real sense, each belligerent will be an island. 
To the extent that an opposing belligerent can prevent that "island's" ability to 
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resupply and/or to gain economic credits with which to purchase military 
supplies, a significant, and perhaps a decisive, advantage can be gained. War may 
not be rational, but it must be functional. 
C. Modern Warfare is Technologically Advanced 
My third assumption, that future wars will be heavily influenced by modem 
technological advances in weaponry, is really a product of empirical verification. 
Once the exclusive province of the more advanced nations, today "smart" 
weapons, missile technology and highly sophisticated naval platforms are avail-
able to virtually all nations. The India-Pakistan war of 1971 was a sobering 
experience for much of the world simply because it was fought by third-world 
nations with big-power weapons. In this conflict, the world witnessed the first 
naval missile battle in history and, I believe, presaged the shape of things to come. 
Since that time, virtually all nations involved with international armed conflict 
have employed modem technology to advantage. 
The weapons of the Persian Gulf tanker war are clear, contemporary examples 
of this reality. Iraq employed modem air platforms to launch Exocet missiles at 
the tankers purchasing oil from Iran. Iran deployed Silkworm missiles both for 
defensive and offensive purposes. By war's end, both nations were engaged in a 
"War of the Cities" using modem missile technology. 
The practices of other nations serve to underscore the point. Argentina 
employed Exocet missiles in the Falklands/Malvinas conflict. Brazil and India 
both are endeavoring to bt~ild _modem submarine fleets. South Korea, Israel, 
France and other nations are heavily involved in supplying modem arms to 
third-world powers. Even guerrilla fighters seem to have unlimited access to 
modem weapons if they have the cash to purchase them. 
D. The Iran-Iraq Tanker War Model of Contemporary Warfare 
My final assumption that the Iran-Iraq Tanker War is a model for wars of the 
future really proceeds from a combination of the three prior assumptions. That 
war began without formality when Iraq crossed the border to occupy disputed 
territory. In all likelihood, future wars will begin as this one did or, equally 
probable, when internal pressures become strong enough for another nation to 
begin actively supporting insurgent forces. 
From the perspective of the belligerents, the war was, of course, total, but it 
was a war of two belligerents only. It can hardly be argued that either the great 
powers or the nations of the Middle East were impartial, but all attempted to 
remain apart from the actual conflict itsel£ I believe that too will be a pattern 
for the future.4 
Of particular interest is the fact that, from the outset, the Persian Gulf Tanker 
War was a conflict of attrition. The objectives were primarily economic, although 
later in the war attrition focused on baser objectives (i.e., when the Iran-Iraq 
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War became a "War of the Cities" and the civilian populace of each nation was 
deliberately targeted). Iraq clearly focused belligerent efforts on the economic 
sustenance of Iran's wannaking capability by targeting the tankers purchasing 
Iranian oil. Iran, without the ability similarly to target Iraqi oil, attempted to 
make the war economically painful for all nations through indiscriminate mining 
and violent harassment of merchants bound for other Persian Gulf ports. 
Finally, both nations fought the conflict with a combination of traditional 
means (e.g., armed foot soldiers) and sophisticated weaponry (e.g., Exocet, Scud 
and Silkworm missiles). In an era when even insurgents have Stinger missiles, 
modern assault rifles and high-tech weapons platforms, we must expect that 
nations who fight each other will surely be able to obtain - and equally surely, 
will utilize - sophisticated means of destruction. 
II. Targeting the Enemy 
Having laid a predicate for my arguments with the foregoing assumptions, I 
can now turn to the issue of targeting. Targeting the enemy has, in essence, two 
main objectives. The first is destruction of the enemy's implements of war and 
the second is reduction of the enemy's capability to sustain a war effort. Both 
objectives seek to bring the war to a successful conclusion through attrition. 
Targeting the enemy implements of war is an obvious necessity, but one not 
necessarily germane to the issue that you seek to resolve in this conference. 
Therefore, I turn to the second objective of targeting, reducing the enemy's 
capability to carry on the fight. 
In any prolonged conflict of the future, it will be essential that the enemy's 
capability to sustain its war effort be targeted from the outset. In a very real sense, 
war has progressed, if you can call it that, from a territorial imperative to an 
economic issue. Accordingly, a major role for naval commanders in the future 
will be to interdict and/or destroy enemy merchant shipping. The concomitant 
conclusion is that economic viability will be a critical element for any belligerent. 
This means, in tum, that the military commander will have an equally important 
task in protecting his own nation's economic base - including merchant vessels. 
This objective of warfare is hardly a novel one. Laying siege to the enemy 
fortification was a form of economic warfare. In the early years of the nineteenth 
century, France and England were locked in a titanic struggle and each sought 
to weaken the other through economic means. Napoleon, by the Berlin Decrees 
of 1806 and the Milan Decrees of 1807, sought to sever Europe's trade with 
England, imposing, in essence, an outward facing blockade. The British struck 
back with the "Orders in Council" by which they hoped to regulate trade so as 
to force their own wares upon Europe while strangling the export trade of France 
and her allies. Neither system was wholly successful, but both were instrumental 
in achieving a threshold of economic pain for the other. 
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During the u.s. Civil War, both blockade and targeting of the South's 
economic base (i.e., international commerce in cotton) played a major role in 
the North's overall strategy to bring the conflict to a successful conclusion. In 
both World Wars, Germany made a concerted effort to interdict Great Britain's 
seaborne resupply efforts while Great Britain, in tum, sought to foreclose all 
commerce to and from occupied Europe. In the Second World War, the 
submarine force of the u.S. Pacific Fleet was employed to destroy Japan's 
merchant fleet and thereby restrict her access to the raw materials that sustained 
her industrial might. In the India-Pakistan War of 1971 visit-and-search tech-
niques were applied to interdict maritime commerce. Iran also employed 
visit-and-search techniques extensively during the Iran-Iraq conflict. 
In sum, targeting an enemy's economic base has proved in the past to be an 
effective means of conducting warfare. Not infrequendy, it has been a decisive 
£lctor, affecting both land and naval campaigns. In an appropriate situation, it may 
be a decisive factor in bringing hostilities to an early resolution. My conclusion, 
then, as a student of history and as a former military planner, is that economics 
will continue to playa significant role in any prolonged armed conflict. 
That brings me to the essence of my thesis. Given that economics have played 
an effective role in warfare of the past, it remains to be seen why targeting the 
enemy's economic base - that is, actual destruction - is, or may be, necessary. 
It is fair, I think, to reflect on the utility ofless destructive means of coercion, 
such as visit and search, blockade and mining. Certainly these mechanisms have 
been effective means of applying economic coercion in the past. 
The reality, I believe, is that the structure of the international polity is 
significandy different today than it was just a few decades ago. Successful 
avoidance of the strictures of mining and blockade have always been possible 
through concerted internal effort. Today, however, nations are economically 
interdependent, international corporations are multi-national in scope and 
structure and, most importandy, profits are there to be made - or lost - on 
the vagaries of world conflict. So long as the enormous profits associated with 
trading in war materials are available, there will be successful attempts to evade 
international commitments stemming from blockades or national directives -
attempts that transcend and multiply substantially the capability of the individual 
nation to avoid the effects of those tactics. In this situation, passive methods of 
interdicting commerce may be useful, but only marginally so. 
III. Capabilities, Umitations and Tactics of Naval Platforms 
A. Capabilities 
At sea, the essence of tactical success in modem naval warfare has been the 
ability to first put ordnance on target. In a limited, conventional war, this tactic, 
when applied to the economic resources of the enemy, well may be a strategic 
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consideration. Today, the capabilities of naval platforms to accomplish that task 
are significandy more impressive than their counterparts of only a few years ago. 
Advanced weapons technology, coupled with increased capabilities to gather 
real-time information about the potential enemy's disposition and location, puts 
at hazard the enemy platform in ways never before even conceived. 
Missile technology yields a stand-off strike capability that is relatively new. 
The U.S. Navy's Harpoon, for example, is an anti-ship guided missile with a 
range of 60 nautical miles. It may be launched from air, surface or subsurface 
platforms in any weather state. The platform launching the Harpoon may receive 
guidance data from other platforms and the missile itself requires no data inputs 
subsequent to launch. During the Iran-Iraq Tanker War, Iraq very effectively 
used French-made Exocet missiles to target oil tankers doing business with Iran. 
The high-speed, sea-skimming capabilities of an Exocet makes it a very 
dangerous weapon indeed, and one for which the merchant ship has little, if 
any, defense. 
In addition to missiles, "smart-weapons" with built-in TV or imaging infrared 
seeker guidance systems provide a good stand-off capability with a high degree 
of accuracy. Similarly, wire guided torpedoes and mines that react only to preset 
conditions may effectively increase the capability to target enemy merchant 
vessels with specificity and relative safety. 
Still, all these capabilities are of little value if the information needed to put 
the ordnance on target is not known. It is probably pedestrian to say that 
intelligence is a constant of war, but it is nevertheless true. The value of radar 
in World War II, or that of the communications intelligence developed in the 
same era, cannot be overemphasized, and the ability to use stand-off weapons 
has now put an enhanced premium on having the information needed to 
accurately deliver those weapons. 
The concomitant of weapons technology and "smart" weapons is that 
intelligence technology has been advanced as well. Today, the ability to gain the 
information needed effectively to use a stand-off capability also has been 
developed. The result is that technology and information capabilities coalesce 
to make sea strikes from afar a probable fact of naval targeting in future conflict.5 
B. Limitations 
Despite these very significant capabilities, there are accompanying limitations. 
Primary among the limitations of modem naval platforms is their vulnerability. 
That first strike capability I mentioned previously is a critical advantage in 
modem naval engagements. No longer are surface ships capable of absorbing 
those first few cannon shots and still win the battle with skillful seamanship and 
daring commanders. Air platforms today do not return to base with their canvas 
skins full of bullet holes. Today's high performance aircraft are more capable 
than their predecessors, but so are the missile defenses used to thwart an aerial 
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attack. Submarines depend on stealth and deep water for survival and are 
extremely vulnerable once on the surface. 
In addition, if the enemy naval forces are a significant threat relative to your 
own, battle tactics will require massing your forces in sufficient numbers to apply 
a concentration of firepower capable of defeating that first attack - or threat of 
attack. This, in tum, means that the ability to disperse forces for commerce 
raiding is reduced. Therefore, the probability is that the raider will be a lonely 
platform. 
Moreover, a warcraft with great offensive firepower and little means of 
defense is an inherently vulnerable platform. That platform will necessarily 
depend on such variables for a first strike capability as stealth, intelligence and 
weapon-range combinations plus speed and agility. To successfully survive its 
attack on the enemy - whether merchant or military - the platform will need 
the stand-off distance afforded by modem technology merely to ensure escape. 
The obvious conclusion to be drawn from these facts is that the air platform or 
the silent submarine, if available, will often be the weapons of choice for targeting 
the merchant vessel. 
Complicating the equation is the fact that there is an inherent scarcity of high 
value munitions and an uncertain ability for those weapons to destroy the enemy. 
Surface platforms, even with their greater magazine capabilities, can carry only 
so much ordnance. Submarines, which are highly vulnerable upon detection, 
can carry only so many torpedoes or submarine-launched cruise missiles 
(SLCMs), and aircraft are even more obviously limited. In any prolonged conflict 
that involves relatively equal naval capabilities between the antagonists, I believe 
we will see ships at sea with empty missile magazines and, perhaps, little to show 
for their delivery. When Admiral Arleigh Burke was asked what he would 
change in the new class of guided missile destroyers named for him, he said he 
would add a brace of cutlasses. 6 
Finally, intelligence, however capable, still has its limitations and this can 
present the Battle Group Commander with a dilemma. Propulsion system and 
radar signatures can be catalogued for high-value military platforms, but the task 
of assembling definitive targeting information on all merchant vessels would be 
daunting. Furthermore, repair and replacement of various electronic com-
ponents would be difficult to track and catalogue as the merchant fleet undergoes 
periodic maintenance. 
The Joint Operational Targeting System OOTS) overhead satellite systems 
and tactical systems available to the Battle Group Commander have superb 
capabilities, but, in the final analysis, none can replace VID (visual identification) 
to confirm whether the potential target is the right one. There is, therefore, 
a risk that any attack on merchant shipping launched over-the-horizon 
without visual ID may find an innocent victim.7 I think it is also fair to state that 
only a few nations possess sophisticated targeting/intelligence systems such as 
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those I have described. In the absence of such systems, less capable nations will 
be inclined to shoot first and ask questions later as we have witnessed during the 
recent Iran/Iraq conflict. In other words, adherence to the 1936 Naval Protocol 
by one party only (perhaps by the more capable nation) may place it at a 
considerable disadvantage - at least until it recognizes how the game is being 
played. 
c. Tactics 
Given the foregoing, my conclusions as to the tactics likely to be employed 
in a future war at sea are that over-the-horizon OTH systems, to the extent 
possible, will be the weapons of choice. Mine warfare may be utilized, and where 
it is, I would expect that it would be employed primarily to blockade ports or 
to channelize merchant shipping. Unquestionably, the nation that possesses aerial 
capabilities to target the enemy merchant vessel will have an advantage that will 
be fully exploited. And, finally, surface and sub-surface attacks will be swift and 
carried out with as much stand-off capability as possible to avoid the potential 
of being targeted in return. Submarines, especially, have awkward command 
and control and limited defensive capabilities. 
I think the conclusions to be drawn from these tactics are fairly clear. There 
is no doubt in my mind that any platform engaging a merchant will attack 
without warning and then retreat rapidly from the area of conflict after that attack 
for the simple reason that the stand-off capabilities available to him are also likely 
to be available to the enemy as well. The uncomplicated fact is, delaying an 
exodus from an area of attack will be hazardous to the longevity of the attacker. 
IV. Relevance of the 1936 Protocol 
All this brings me to the central topic of your discussion today - the relevance 
in 1990 of the London Protocol of 1936. If I were once again to place myself 
in the position of a battle group commander, responsible for interdicting enemy 
commerce on the high seas, I would have to consider the following issues and 
problems when a possible enemy merchant vessel is discovered. 
A. Surface Platform Interdiction 
Should my platform engage or warn? If I warn at a distance, will my 
communication to the merchant reveal my own position and subject me to 
immediate targeting by enemy warships, enemy aircraft or by the merchant 
itse1f?8 In any case, would a warning from an unseen enemy be sufficient to cause 
the merchant to stop and abandon ship? If! warn through visual signals, to avoid 
electro-magnetic emissions, will the merchant nevertheless broadcast the situa-
tion? Is the merchant being escorted by other vessels, including air or sub-surface 
platforms? Even if none of these situations are immediately threatening, will my 
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proximity in the area for the length of time necessary to warn, to permit the 
crew to abandon and to then sink or scuttle the merchant nevertheless be 
unacceptably hazardous to my own unit? 
B. Subsurface Pla!fOrm Interdiction 
Should my submarine silendy torpedo the merchant or should I come to the 
surface to warn? All my previous problems with the surface vessel now arise, 
with a few more thrown in. A submarine on the surface is not only an unwieldy 
platform, slow to respond and maneuver, but, without the cloak of deep water, 
it is highly vulnerable with virtually no surface oriented defenses. Moreover, if 
the merchant should carry armament itself, it would have an immediate tactical 
advantage over the submarine within range of its weapons system. Even without 
armament, it is probable that a large merchant would withstand ramming far 
better than a submarine. 
C. The Airborne Plaiform 
Of all platforms, the airborne one stands in the least risk of immediate 
destruction from warning the enemy merchant before releasing ordnance on it. 
Yet, here too, the anomaly of the London Protocol for modern warfare is 
evident. It is true that the air platform may be better able to escape enemy forces 
called to defend the merchant that has been warned, but that says no more than 
that the warning may also be the hunter's signal to abandon the quarry. 
Moreover, the length of time necessary to bring the ship to all stop and to 
disembark passengers, crew and ship's papers will almost certainly exceed the 
fuel capability of an attack aircraft to loiter over the target. Indeed, if the aircraft 
were to be required to permit passengers and crew to disembark prior to 
commencing a bombing attack, the purpose of the interdiction could be defeated 
by a dilatory crew. The alternative would be to hold that aircraft may not attack 
merchant vessels.9 
V. The Commanders Decision Matrix 
The military commander's focus is on his mission, not on the specific platform 
he may use, and generally not on the specific tactics he may employ, to 
accomplish the mission. to As a general proposition, the military commander will 
not avoid using an effective and efficient tactic, otherwise lawful, merely because 
of an ambiguity in international law. Having said that, I also need to say that I 
do not believe any U.S. military commander would reject, out of hand, any 
ostensible requirement of international law when structuring his forces and 
tactics. 
I think this is true because we who have been responsible for planning and 
executing the application of military force are acutely aware that the laws of 
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armed conflict both serve a valid purpose and complement the principles of 
warfare. Yet, it is we, and our forces, who sit on that knife's edge when it comes 
time to take up arms. Because of this, we feel keenly the need for reality and 
theory to come together in international law and particularly so in the laws of 
armed conflict. To give you an idea how the military planner might approach 
this problem, it may be helpful for you to understand how I personally might 
view the situation. My own decision matrix would begin with observations 
something like this: 
First, my objective is to help bripg the war to a speedy conclusion on favorable 
terms to my government. Second, I have an inherent responsibility to protect 
my nation's assets - which includes my own forces. Third, I have a similarly 
inherent responsibility to minimize the effects of war to the extent possible. 
Fourth, I view interdiction of enemy economic resupply efforts as a viable means 
of shortening the conflict and minimizing damage on both sides. Fifth, my 
enemy has targeting capabilities similar to mine. Sixth, I cannot commit all my 
forces to commerce raiding- substantial assets must be massed to engage enemy 
military forces or to support the land and air campaign. Seventh, modem 
communications and intelligence methods are such that, once located, any 
military platform is at risk from enemy forces. Eighth, high value modem 
munitions will generally be reserved for high value targets. Ninth, use of iron 
bombs and naval gunme will decrease range to potential enemy targets and 
increase vulnerability. Tenth, in shallow waters or restricted operating areas the 
vulnerability of submarines is magnified. 
As I put these considerations into the tactical situation I find an inherent 
inconsistency between the most effective means of accomplishing my military 
mission and the literal requirements of the London Protocol. If I can accomplish 
my mission with minimal loss of life and destruction of property then, as a 
responsible military commander, I must do so. While I recognize that the 
inherent rationale for the London Protocol is to minimize loss of life, with 
today's modem weapons systems available to most nations, I believe adherence 
to that Protocol will, more probably than not, yield the opposite result. 
Blind adherence to the literal words of the Protocol would unacceptably put 
at risk all of my forces, decrease the probability of success for my assigned mission 
and unnecessarily prolong the conflict. My conclusion is, therefore, that the 
Protocol does not meet well the needs of the community of nations it serves. 
If! were to go to war today, with the conditions as I have assumed them to 
be, I would recommend to my superiors tactics that would be inherendy at odds 
with the London Protocol. Not insignificandy, however, I believe those tactics 
would be consonant with the original purpose of the Protocol- to minimize 
the effects of war. 
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*Fonner President, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, R.I. Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.). The author 
would like to express his appreciation for the assisunce given by CDR M.E. Bowman,JAGC, USN in editing 
earlier drafts of this article. 
1. I recognize that this analysis does not take into account the collective security provisions of the United 
Nations Charter. Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter, ifimplemented, could mandate involvement by nations 
on beh21f of the collective security and peace-keeping mission of the Security Council. A few years ago I 
might have dismissed that possibility out of hand; today, as the gulfbetween Western and Bloc nations appears 
to be narrowing, there may be some potential for implementation of the original collective security mission 
envisioned in 1945. 
2. Some might argue that Panama is a recent exception. Although the United States did not consider 
that a state of "war" existed, certainly the dictator Noriega gave up a significant advantage with his premature 
and clumsy declaration that a state of war was in effect between Panama and the United States. 
3. Although I do not intend to raise the specter of large scale conventional war, it is worth noting that 
should such a conflict occur between NATO and Warsaw Pact nations, a primaty survival requirement for 
the Soviets necessarily would be to prevent or delay the resupply of Europe. That, in tum, would mean a 
militaty objective of interdicting and! or destroying merchant shipping bound from the United States for 
European ports. 
4. There may be circumstances in which a nation is bound by a collective security arrangement to enter 
a conflict according to its international obligations. The NATO alliance, for example, is an "attack on one is 
an attack on all" alliance. Nevertheless, to the extent feasible, I believe that in the origins of any future conflict 
all nations will endeavor to view the conflict as a "you and he" problem rather than an "us and them" situation. 
5. This is certainly true of land targets today. It may be less true of seaborne merchant targets depending 
on the weaponty available to the belligerent. It is difficult to imagine selecting weaponty as expensive and 
limited in numbers as the Harpoon to target merchant vessels. On the other hand, if the belligerent has "smart 
bombs" or weapons such as Exocet missiles available, it should be equally true for the merchant vessel. 
6. Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., Fleet Tactics: Theoty and Practice 180 (1987). 
7. In essence, this was the problem that resulted in the accidental targeting by Iraqi air force pilots of the 
USSSlark. 
8. Although we tend to think of merchants as unanned traders, in a prolonged conflict I would expect 
that merchants would receive a certain amount of armament as was the practice in World War II. Certainly 
shoulder-fired anti-air missile defenses are probable. Naval guns and possibly even some missile support might 
also be expected. 
9. Aircraft are not specifically mentioned in the Protocol. I am aware that the inability of an airplane to 
provide for the safety of passengers, crew and ships papers has persuaded some commentators to adopt the 
view that the Protocol stands for the proposition that air interdiction and destruction of merchant shipping is 
not permitted. If this were true, I would view the result as a situation in which international law acted as a 
bar to a legitimate exercise of armed force. In a full career of association with the laws of anned conflict it has 
never occurred to me that such a bar would be a rational expression of international law. Moreover, ifit did 
purport to be such a bar I seriously doubt that the "law" would be followed for the simple reason that it would 
not be an accurate expression of the international will. 
10. By this I do not mean that any and all means may be employed or that any and all weapons may be 
used. The predicate for militaty planning is legitimacy, both in weapons and in tactics. 
